Here is my crappy essay.
Critically Evaluate Kant’s Views On Moral Motivation
In this essay I hope to point out that Kant’s view on moral motivation seems to hang together as an argument, but if it were carried out by all people for all time people would probably not be very nice, which raises the problem of the argument being counter-intuitive in what it leads to with regards to what people may generally think is a good world to live in. Kant’s view on moral motivation is that only actions performed from the motive of duty are morally good actions. To act from duty is “the necessity of acting from respect for the law” (Kant). When Kant refers to law, he may not necessarily be referring to whatever laws may be found in the statute book, but laws that can universalized so as to be able to imagine a world in which everybody behaves in such a way, and yet not have the universalized behavior contradict the aim you wish to fulfill when carrying out the action on your own. He says that no other motivation for an action is worthy of moral praise, not even motivations that generally considered desirable traits such as love, sympathy, comradeship, and generosity. You must carry out the moral action simply because it is the right thing to do.
One criticism of the claim that only motivation from duty is moral, is the notion that actions motivated from, for example, love are also morally praiseworthy. To jump into some water to save your drowning child because you love the child and don’t want him to die, is according to Kant’s view not a morally praiseworthy action. Though if a stranger were drowning and you saved him because you saw it as a duty to save another person in need, then that would be a morally praiseworthy action, according to Kant’s view. To say that it was morally praiseworthy to save the stranger but not your own child seems counter-intuitive to most people- counter-intuitive means to be counter to what seems the morally right thing to do regardless of what a moral theory would dictate you think. However, the point Kant makes about love not being the motivation that makes an action morally praiseworthy is that actions motivated from love are not always good actions. Actions motivated by love can be bad, such as if a loved one commits a murder and you then shield them from being brought to justice for their wrong action, your action of hiding them which is motivated by love, leads to the wrong action of preventing a criminal being punished. Similar examples can be thought up for motivation from sympathy, comradeship, and generosity. They can sometimes lead to actions that aren’t good. Thus Kant can criticize these motivations as being inconsistent when comes to bringing about morally right actions. Whereas motivation from duty always brings about an action that is morally right because the action you carry out is being done because it’s the right action. Kant’s view on moral motivation seems correct to me insofar as he is concerned that a certain motivation bring about good actions every time, and that the other motivations are inconsistent in bringing about a good action.
Kant’s view on moral motivation may come up against greater problems when dealing with existing inclinations and duty in the sense that if an action is carried out due to an inclination as well being motivated by duty, whether the action is morally praiseworthy. Kant mentions a guy who is in a state of “deadly insensibility” and who has no inclination to help other people, but does so out of duty is morally praiseworthy, whereas the a guy who acts in a good way out of an existing inclination to do good, is not. Again this is counter-intuitive. To say that a person who only does good things grudgingly is morally more praiseworthy than somebody who commits good deeds freely and willingly doesn’t seem to intuitively hang right with most people. In the Herman paper, it says that an action can still be morally praiseworthy in conjunction with existing tendencies to carry out the good action, so long as the motivation from duty is enough to ensure the action takes place even if the inclinations to commit such an act weren’t there. Some think that this might be good enough to overcome the problem of counter-intuition just mentioned, but I think this isn’t the case. If the good action were to take place even without the existing inclinations because the motivation from duty was enough, and thus the action becomes morally praiseworthy, then all that does is reinforce the idea that duty is the main factor in determining moral praiseworthyness. The other inclinations are like needless third wheels that seem to perform no function in determining moral praiseworthyness other than perhaps making the person who makes the good action more palatable, since perhaps a good action from a nice person feels better than one from a grouchy grudging person. It’s a pretty bad compromise on Kant’s idea that any other inclination or motive removes all moral praiseworthyness from an action because it doesn’t really change anything with regards to what actively makes an action good. It does not effectively challenge Kant’s assertion that duty is the motivation that makes an action morally praiseworthy. There’s also a question of how a person can choose to act from duty, especially if dealing with a person who they already have inclination to help. It would be difficult to decide to yourself that you help them from duty and duty alone, without any element of sympathy or love, with which in Kant’s view would disqualify the act from being morally praiseworthy. It seems hard to see how a person could choose to ignore their feelings for a person or just switch their feelings on or off for a person who they are fond of, in order to act from duty and thus be moral. Also, when somebody thanks you for doing something so lovely, to answer “I was motivated by duty and duty alone” would likely see you on the fast track back to singledom. This again points to counter-intuition, in addition to the seemingly practical problems of trying to follow the rules of Kant’s morality.
Another problem with Kant’s view on moral motivation is that when suicide is mentioned, only living when life is completely and utterly miserable, only then does your life become morally praiseworthy. Since the preservation of life is an inclination, and not motivated by duty, then its preservation is not morally praiseworthy unless the inclination to preserve life has been stamped out and you only persist in living out of the duty to preserve your life. If a person has lost the inclination to preserve their own life, then to be a morally praiseworthy person for living would require you not wish to live, and be suicidal. Again this is a counter-intuitive criteria of acting in a morally praiseworthy way. For thus far it is found that to be morally praiseworthy in a high degree, you’d need to be a grudging person who has no inclination to do good deeds, and be suicidal and have inclination to preserve your own life, this also suggesting that you get no pleasure at all out of being alive for if life were enjoyable that would kindle an inclination to preserve what is an enjoyable life. Having a world of suicidals who are grudging in their good deeds is rather counter-intuitive to what many people would like the world to be like. Another problem would be how exactly a person carry on living only from motivation from duty. It usually takes a lot before somebody ceases to wish to preserve their own life, and it’s not exactly something you can switch on or off, or say to yourself “I no longer wish to preserve my own life”. However, at the same time this objection still doesn’t fault the argument that duty to what is right is the only thing that can consistently bring about good actions. However, Kant’s response could well be that he isn’t concerned with the outcome of following his correct moral code because he is more concerned with the rightness of the actions (deontology) rather than seeing that they have consequences that people like and find desirable. This sort of makes it harder to argue with Kant about whether it’s desirable for people to be morally praiseworthy in the sense that they follow his prescription for being moral. For if Kant isn’t concerned with what consequences his moral theory has other than that people will be moral by following his rules, then to rebuke him by saying that the consequence of living like this would be bad wouldn’t bother Kant if he is not concerned with the consequences, but only ensure that the person commits a moral act from the right motivation. Having said that, Mill says that Kant is ultimately after good and desirable consequences, though if suicidal people who only do good deeds grudgingly is a means to desirable ends, or are desirable in themselves as the embodiment of moral agents who always act from the morally praiseworthy motivation duty, then I would not place to heavy an emphasis on this point. However, Mill would have a good point by saying that morality does not actively promote what is harmful, as Kant would see immoral behaviour as irrational and harmful. Mill’s criticism is still rather limited in that it still doesn’t undermine the logic of the argument of Kant’s view on moral motivation that only motivation from duty consistently yields good actions.
One trickier criticism for Kant’s view is that duty is the only criteria for a moral action. As mentioned, the Herman paper comes up with a compromise with regards to inclinations, and duty, but this doesn’t address why good action motivated by love or sympathy cannot be considered moral. It just mimes Kant’s view that they aren’t moral motivations. It is intuitive to say that to save somebody from drowning motivated by love of them is moral, and the person who saves them should be considered as morally praiseworthy. In the light of Kant’s deontological moral view however, this view could be hard to maintain. For whether or not the act motivated by love is considered a morally good action would depend on the outcome of the action, if the motivation of love led a jealous lover to kill, then the act motivated by love would be considered bad. If the action motivated by love led to a person giving a kidney to somebody they love to save their life, that would be considered morally good. However, when you start judging whether actions motivated by love are good depending on their outcome, you start judging morality by consequentialist measures. This might show that Kant should not take a deontological approach to morality, although it still doesn’t really undermine the logic of his argument in itself if you sympathise with the deontological view of what morality.
In conclusion, Kant’s argument does hang together well with regards to pointing out that motivation from duty is the only thing that can consistently yields a good action. However, when he says that actions performed only from duty are morally praiseworthy is counter-intuitive, and it seems unfair to morally praise a good deed done only grudgingly, and not praise a good action motivated by love or a natural inclination to do good things. Kant’s view also seems to entail that for your life to be morally praiseworthy, you must have so little enjoyment from it that your inclination to preserve your life no longer exists. In addition to the counter-intuitive implications of his view, there is also the problem of how people can choose to act purely from duty. With regards to helping out a stranger this is more plausible, though there may still be the element of sympathy, rather than pure duty. Though when dealing with people who you have an attachment to, to suggest you can act purely from duty and ignore all other motivational considerations seem rather impractical. Thus Kant’s view as a realistic way to conduct morally good behaviour probably isn’t so good in practice as it is in yielding consistently morally praiseworthy actions.

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